

new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-chief and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant; *<tna the General-in-chief shall be responsible that it move as early as that day.*

Two things in this extraordinary production arrest attention.

The first is the unmistakable tone of suspicion of the (General-in-chief, manifest throughout the document. No one would suppose that this paper is an order from a military superior to a military inferior; the paper reads like a manifesto, like a threat, a warning, a statement to some official who has been *BUHpeeted* of attempting to break or evade the law, that *lie* would not be allowed to do it. Viewed in this light, this "order," like its predecessors, merely exhibit* Mr. Lincoln's serious defects as an administrator,—EB a man of affairs. Had he been equal to his position as Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, he would have issued no such document as this; he would simply have ordered the General-in-chief to take as his first task the reduction of the enemy's batteries on the lower Potomac, and to begin it at once. Nothing else was needed.

The second thing we observe here is that the

President has substituted a desire for an expedition
figiimnt the enemy's batteries on the lower Potomac
for a desire for a movement against the enemy's position
at Manassas Junction, which, as we have seen,
he had hitherto pressed upon the attention of the

¹ The italics are ours.